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Health is certainly a valuable asset in the life of every human being and of 
particular relevance for a flourishing childhood. As empirical research concerning 
the social determinants of health shows, its distribution can, at least to a certain 
extent, be influenced by the way a society is arranged. Many philosophers now 
acknowledge that a fair distribution of health has to be a central part of a just 
society and they discuss to what extent a right to health can be justified. However, 
they do not typically distinguish between physical and mental health and neglect 
the special problems arising from these distinct, though related, perspectives. In 
this paper, we argue in favour of such a distinction and ask whether a minimally 
just society ought to include mental health among the goods that are to be 
distributed in a fair way among its children. Furthermore, we investigate the 
relationship between mental health and happiness and ask whether making 
mental health a subject of justice implies that children are entitled not only to a 
healthy but also to a happy childhood. Despite the positive impact of happiness 
on the lives of children, we conclude that happiness cannot be incorporated into a 
functional theory of justice, since it does not fully meet the criteria of objectivity, 
measurability and influenceability.
Introduction
Health is without a doubt a condition of possibility for developing one’s life, which is especially 
relevant in the case of children. However, social structures can and indeed do have a significant 
impact on how health is materialised, as empirical research concerning the social determinants of 
health has already shown. Political philosophy is certainly facing the need to address the question 
of distribution in relation to justice and health, which leads to questions about the justification 
and limits of a right to health. Furthermore, the distinction between physical and mental health 
is commonly neglected, or addressed in a compartmentalised way that ignores the interrelation 
between mind and body. In this paper, we propose an answer to the question of whether it is 
reasonable to assume that a minimally just society must also include childhood mental health in 
the goods to be distributed according to shared norms of equality. In addition, we examine the 
relationship between mental health and happiness, and consider whether happiness can be a matter 
of justice involving the right to mental health.
1 This research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Project: P 26480-G15.
2 Corresponding author.
original work is properly cited.
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In the first section, we argue that there are good reasons to define health as the ability to achieve 
valuable functionings and capabilities, as recently suggested by Venkatapuram (2013). Such 
an understanding has advantages both over the definition of health as the absence of disease or 
as a state of complete physical, psychological and social well-being. It does not reduce health 
to a value-free ‘normality’ and acknowledges the role of a person’s (social) environment in 
determining her health status. 
In the second section, we present a basic account of what social justice demands in the case of 
children and locate this account within the capability approach. We introduce this approach in a 
general way and discuss the central place it gives to the freedom to achieve well-being by virtue of 
normative reasoning. We then argue that, in the case of children, this understanding of well-being 
has to be linked to the notion of well-becoming. In making this argument, we refer to the current 
debates and studies on the well-being of children, which we believe can enrich the capability 
approach substantially and should therefore inform its normative evaluations concerning children. 
From this perspective, children are entitled to a basic set of functionings and capabilities that the 
realisation of which depends, in turn, on the way a society arranges its basic structure of society.
In the third section, we further clarify what the idea of health as an object of justice means. We 
also argue that the special status of children implies that they are entitled to the functioning, but 
not the capability, of being healthy; that is, they should not have the freedom to choose whether 
they want this capability or not. We therefore argue for a certain kind of health paternalism 
regarding children that cannot generally be justified in the case of adults. 
In the fourth section, we distinguish between physical and mental health and argue that, while 
it is uncontroversial that physical health is a subject of justice, the case for mental health is more 
demanding. We show that, depending on the definition, mental health can indeed comply with 
the necessary criteria for being considered a subject of distributional justice. However, further 
analysis makes it clear that the same cannot be said for happiness and that there is no justice-
based entitlement for children to experience a happy childhood. The relationship between the 
capability approach, which we use as our normative framework, and happiness has already been 
discussed in Bruni et al. (2008). However, most of the contributions to this publication tend to 
focus on economic theory, without scrutinising the special situation of children, or exploring the 
relationship between physical and mental health on the one hand and happiness on the other. Since 
these are precisely the crucial elements of our own argument, we do not discuss this significant 
work in detail.  
What is health?
It is generally acknowledged that health is a central dimension of human well-being. However, 
the concept of health has been defined in different ways and there is no clear consensus in 
the literature about its exact meaning and scope. Some scholars have tried to define health 
simply as the absence of disease (Boorse 1975), where the notion of disease ‘encompasses 
all the conditions that are seen to be a deviation from a “normal” or “natural” life course or 
physiological functioning of a human being’ (Venkatapuram 2013: p. 272). There is some merit 
to this approach, but it is also widely recognised today that this definition is too narrow and that it 
relates to a concept of normality that is difficult or perhaps impossible to grasp. We would either 
have to understand normality as some kind of ideal that is hardly ever achieved in reality, or we 
would have to make use of statistical normality, which faces the problem of having to account 
for intraspecific variations that are not considered diseases. Both options have objectionable 
consequences, and therefore it can be stated that a theory of health as functional normality is 
deficient as a general theory of health (Wachbroit 1994; Ereshefsky 2009). Other research bodies, 
most importantly the World Health Organization, suggest a completely different understanding 
of health, namely as a state of complete well-being, encompassing a physical, psychological 
and social dimension. If health is defined in this way, it becomes much more than the mere 
absence of disease, which better accords with our intuitions about health. However, in terms of 
this definition, health is no longer an important part of well-being but well-being itself. Not only 
does this overburden the concept of health, it is also simply wrong. Being educated is certainly of 
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importance for well-being, but the lack of education is not a form of ill-health, although the latter 
can be caused by the former. Furthermore, in the absence of any explanation of what is meant by 
the term ‘complete’, health is likely to become an unattainable goal. 
Due to these difficulties with certain common notions of health, it is reasonable to choose 
another approach that characterises the health status of a person not by some standard of normal 
functioning or complete well-being, but by what she is effectively able to be and to do in her 
life. Taking this insight as a starting point, Venkatapuram (2011, 2013) has recently offered an 
alternative definition of health, which we want to employ as the basis for our own argument. 
Venkatapuram refines and develops further Lennart Nordenfelt’s understanding of health as the 
ability to achieve vital goals, and connects it to the capability approach as defended by Martha 
Nussbaum (Nordenfelt 1995; Nussbaum 2000, 2011). In doing so, he defines health as the ability 
to achieve a basic set of beings and doings, or to put it in the language of the capability approach, 
to have a fundamental capability to achieve essential capabilities and functionings. Some 
terminological remarks are appropriate here. ‘Functionings’ refer to the valuable activities and 
states that make up a person’s well-being – e.g. having a good job, being adequately nourished or 
having self-respect. Usually, capability theorists further differentiate between ‘the various things 
a person may value doing or being’ (Sen 1999: p. 75) and achieved functionings, understood as 
the particular beings or doings a person has realised at a given point in time. Capabilities are 
understood as ‘substantive freedoms’ to achieve valuable functionings and a life one has reason to 
value (Sen 1999: p. 74).3
A definition of health that belongs to the capability approach might therefore be defined 
differently, depending on whether one focuses on functionings or on capabilities. On the one 
hand, health can be defined as the ability to achieve valuable functionings, or as the ability to 
achieve capabilities. In this contribution, we cannot discuss in detail which of these options is 
the better one. We rather simply assume that the option one chooses depends on the context and 
different kinds of factors. On the other hand, there is the question of whether health itself should 
be conceptualised as a functioning or as a capability, which is tantamount to asking whether it 
should be up to persons themselves to reach a certain health status, or if another party (the state 
or a child’s parents) is justified in promoting a person’s health without taking her choices and 
preferences into account. We will take up this issue in the third section, where we discuss the 
fundamental role health plays in the lives of children. 
 In any case, and this is the crucial issue here, Venkatapuram suggests that Nordenfelt’s category 
of vital achievements is best specified in accordance with the list of specific functionings and 
capabilities proposed by Nussbaum, which reflects, as she puts it, a life worthy of human dignity 
(Nussbaum 2011: pp. 33–34). We cannot scrutinise this list here or discuss whether it is indeed 
exhaustive (as Nussbaum claims), or too demanding (as some of her critics maintain), but we will 
simply assume that Nussbaum’s list contains some of the most valuable dimensions of any human 
being’s life on a general level. Our focus here is on some of the consequences of a definition of 
health based on such a capability theory. 
Since being healthy depends on a person’s capability to achieve valuable goals, the means by 
which she is able to use the resources under her command for her own purposes is of central 
importance. This, in turn, depends on many aspects that can be termed ‘conversion factors’. 
With this notion, capability scholars refer to the relation between a good and the achievement of 
certain beings and doings, drawing attention to the conditions under which a person can actually 
employ resources for her own ends (Sen 1992). Conversion factors can be divided into personal 
ones (e.g. metabolism and physical condition), social ones (e.g. public policies, social norms, 
discriminating practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies and power relations) and environmental 
ones (e.g. climate and geographical location), all of which point to different aspects of the process 
of transforming goods into valuable functionings (Robeyns 2005). In the context of health, social 
conversion factors are of great importance. The social environment in which a person lives and the 
support she gets from others co-determine what she is effectively able to do and to be. Different 
environments thus provide varying conditions under which central capabilities can be achieved, 
3 For further explanations and discussions of these and related concepts, see Crocker (2008) and Comim et al. (2008). 
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and being healthy is a function of all these factors. This implies that two individuals with the 
same medical condition – diabetes, for example – who live in different environments and therefore 
have different access to medicine and care, do actually have a different health status. The one who 
is able to achieve the central capabilities and functionings is healthy, the other one, who is not 
able to do so, suffers from ill-health. Accordingly, a person’s health should be evaluated by taking 
into account her social environment, her access to medicine, and support that helps her overcome 
obstacles in the way to achieving valuable capabilities and functionings. Health is therefore not 
only determined by genetic factors but also, to a large extent, by the social environment and to 
some degree also by one’s personal choices. Health cannot be defined as complete well-being, 
however, since the ability to achieve a basic set of valuable goals does not imply that a person is 
functioning at an optimal level in a physical, psychological and social sense.
Social justice for children: a capability approach
So far, we have seen that the capability approach can help us define the concept of health by 
providing a set of valuable goals a healthy person must have the means to achieve. We now want 
to focus on one of its other aims, namely the formulation of minimal standards of justice that a 
good society is to warrant its citizens. The core normative claim of the capability approach is 
that the freedom to achieve well-being, which is expressed by a person’s capabilities, should be 
the fundamental normative category used to evaluate a person’s social position (Robeyns 2005). 
This has two implications for social justice. First, a just society would have to guarantee to all 
citizens a level of functionings and capabilities that allows them democratic participation on an 
equal level with all other members of the society (Nussbaum 2006; Crocker 2008; Sen 2009). 
The capability approach therefore entails a sufficiency rule for the distribution of functionings 
and capabilities that is guided by the idea that every citizen deserves equal respect and concern. 
In the second place, it brings to our attention the many different ways in which an individual 
can utilise resources for her ends. It should be emphasised, however, that only functionings and 
capabilities, that are objectively determinable and susceptible to the influence of social factors, can 
in fact be the subjects of social justice (Anderson 2010). The first criterion is necessary in order 
to keep a critical distance to such phenomena as adapted preferences and alienation; the second 
is required for justice to qualify as a feasible and achievable concern. Low levels of functionings 
and capabilities that are caused by independent factors can be considered tragic, but not within the 
ambit of social justice.
The philosophical literature on the capability approach has hitherto focused almost exclusively 
on adults and neglected the question of the well-being of children and its implications for 
normative theory (Graf and Schweiger 2014). In what follows, we want to address three aspects 
that are crucial for such an endeavour. First, children’s well-being is different from that of adults, 
and it would be wrong to assume that the former can simply be reduced to the latter. Ongoing 
research shows that there are different dimensions that matter for children, or that should be 
weighted differently than in the case of adults. Due to the special status of children – which is 
characterised by vulnerability, a lack of relevant skills and knowledge, dependency and their 
potential to develop into self-governing agents – love and care are of the utmost importance, 
while the ability to live a self-determined life is not. Of course, this changes over time and it is 
important to recognise children as social from an early age and, to some extent, also as moral 
agents (Mayall 2002; Alderson 2008). However, their agency is exercised differently and should 
not lead to the conclusion that they should be granted an adult-like right to self-determination 
(Purdy 1992). Stressing the importance of the well-being of children places the focus squarely on 
childhood itself, and requires that we ask what children need, qua children, in order to live a good 
life. This line of enquiry transcends the adult-centeredness of most theories in political philosophy. 
And since an acceptable notion of children’s well-being should include the child’s perspective, it 
also takes seriously the child as an active agent. Second, as current research shows, it is crucial 
to recognise that children are embedded in a variety of social environments and social groupings 
that influence their lives: from the institutions and groups that most immediately and directly 
impact on children’s lives (e.g. family, close friends and school), to the political system with its 
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different institutions (e.g. the social security system and educational and health policy), to general 
cultural matters prevalent in a society (e.g. how it conceives the proper role of the child and the 
family). Such a holistic approach, which considers children’s lives and development as a whole 
and in relation to many different social environments, has been termed ‘ecological’ (McAuley 
and Rose 2010). It was pioneered by developmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner in the 
1970s (Bronfenbrenner 1979) and draws attention to the variety of agents affecting the well-being 
of a child. Jane Aldgate accurately describes the central features of this increasingly influential 
perspective as follows:
Ecological theory suggests that children are surrounded by layers of successively larger 
and more complex social groupings which have an influence on them. These include 
family and extended family, friendship networks, school, neighbourhood and work 
influences, and the family’s place within the community. Still wider is the influence of the 
culture within which children live. Children across the world will experience childhood in 
many different ways (Aldgate 2006: p. 23). 
Children’s well-being therefore depends on many players in the child’s environment and cannot 
be deemed a purely private matter, attributing sole responsibility to parents or caregivers. This point 
is particularly important when we recognise that disadvantages are often simultaneously present 
in different social contexts, reinforcing each other and jeopardising a person’s well-being. This is 
also true in the case of adults. However, the special status of children demands that more weight is 
given to such an ‘ecological perspective’ (McAuley and Rose 2010). In the third place, as important 
as it is to recognise children as human beings, one must also acknowledge that they usually grow 
up into adult members of society and that a developmental perspective in evaluating their lives 
is equally fundamental. This is where the notion of well-becoming comes into play: it refers to 
the transition from one state of well-being to another and therefore includes a time component. 
Well-being and well-becoming should be considered together when evaluating a child’s life. 
Well-being in childhood is often conducive to good development, but this relation is not always 
straightforward. Sometimes a child’s future requirements may interfere with her well-being in the 
present – particularly in a subjective sense – because the well-becoming aspect has priority. It is 
easy to imagine instances where a child does not want to, say, see a dentist, but it is clearly in her 
near-future and long-term interests that her care-givers make sure that she undergoes the relevant 
treatment. Such examples show that ‘[t]he status and position of children have to be understood 
within the framework of the present, as description, and within a framework of life course and 
development, as predictions’ (Ben-Arieh et al. 2014b: p. 15). Hence, well-being and well-becoming 
provide complementary perspectives that must be weighed up against one another in order to 
decide what is in a child’s best interest. Furthermore, well-becoming is closely tied to the notion 
of autonomy. An important aim of a just society is to ensure that its children reach adulthood in a 
condition where many significant life options are available to them (Feinberg 1980). As adults, they 
should be capable of living self-determined lives they have reason to value, and childhood serves 
inter alia as a preparation for this extremely valuable end. We do not wish to suggest that a person’s 
becoming ends upon reaching adulthood. However, from a capability perspective, the achievement 
of the capacity for self-government is one of the most important transitions in a person’s life and 
must therefore cover an important aspect of the notion of well-becoming.
One of the most important questions for the specification of the justice-based claims of children 
concerns the identification and specification of those domains of well-being and well-becoming 
(which have to be defined via child-specific functionings and capabilities), that ought to be 
secured up to a certain threshold. An adequate answer must therefore first identify the domains 
of well-being and well-becoming and second, analyse if they are objectively determinable and 
influenceable by the structure and social institutions of a society. Concerning the first issue, we 
suggest that a list of dimensions specified by Mario Biggeri and his colleagues provide a good 
approximation of what is valuable in a child’s life. Biggeri et al. employ a pragmatic methodology 
involving many different stakeholders and identify 18 domains as important for the well-being 
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and well-becoming of children: life and physical health, love and care, mental well-being, bodily 
integrity and safety, social relations, participation/information, education, freedom from economic 
and non-economic exploitation, shelter and environment, leisure activities, respect, religion 
(spirituality), religion and identity (tradition and culture), personal autonomy, personal autonomy 
(as agency), mobility, ability to understand/interpret, and ability to plan/imagine/think (Biggeri 
and Mehrotra 2011). Concerning the second issue, we require a thorough and empirically informed 
analysis for each and every item on the list. Such a project far exceeds what we can achieve in this 
contribution. We will therefore focus exclusively on the dimension of health and analyse the extent 
to which it can be the subject of social justice.
Is health the subject matter of justice for children?
Health is clearly fundamental for a person’s well-being, but can it be considered a proper subject of 
social justice? While many influential political philosophers do not address this question in depth, 
or suggest that health is first and foremost a natural good that is not the subject of distributional 
questions (Rawls 1971), it is widely acknowledged nowadays that health is of great importance 
for considerations of ethics and justice (Venkatapuram 2011). Returning to the definition of health 
we proposed earlier, it is clear that the social environment and other conversion factors strongly 
influence persons’ abilities to achieve their vital goals (understood as central capabilities and 
functionings) and that reducing health to a certain physical condition is an inadequate solution. 
This is borne out by research on the social determinants of health (Braveman et al. 2011). For 
example, socio-economic position, exposure to stress, toxic environments, absence of clean water 
and adequate nutrition are all crucial for the health status of children and adults alike. These 
factors, rather than individual predispositions, are the main sources for inequalities in morbidity 
and mortality between social groups. Due to its importance and its ‘social nature’, health 
does qualify as a priority concern for justice and is rightfully included in the preliminary list of 
capabilities and functionings that comprise the well-being of children. Furthermore, health also 
satisfies the criterion of being objectively determinable, since a person’s ability to achieve valuable 
goals can – at least in principle – be ascertained by scientific methods.
We now see three arguments in favour of prioritising the functioning of health over its capability 
in the case of children, which would justify certain kinds of paternalistic actions. This means that 
certain agents in the child’s environment (parents, the state, etc.) have the moral obligation to 
secure a particular health status for children, even if sometimes the relevant actions have to be 
carried out against a child’s will.4 Due to the fundamental role of health in the life of every person 
and the special characteristics that distinguish children from adults, it is reasonable to assume that 
children must have or learn to have the ability to achieve valuable capabilities and functionings, 
and not only the real freedom to choose this ability if they want to.
We support this form of paternalism for the following reasons: the limited autonomy of children, 
the importance of paternalistic interventions for promoting functioning and especially its influence 
on the later life-course and the development of the child. However, it is not obvious that these 
arguments are sufficient to support the claim that the functioning of health should be prioritised 
over the capability for adults as well. The high value of autonomy – local and global – for adults 
appears to justify the capability view here, as suggested by Nussbaum.
Children, as we have already pointed out, are a very heterogeneous group, but in general they 
are less autonomous than adults because of their still-developing mental capacities. Children – 
at least up to a certain age or developmental stage – are not in a position to adequately judge the 
reasons for and effects of their actions. Until their maturity, they are simply overburdened by the 
freedom to choose to be healthy or not. We therefore view a concern with health as a valuable 
functioning as a justified form of paternalism and we would also contend that a society that gives 
children the freedom to damage their health is unjust. Such a society would willingly risk the 
actual and future health of children based on a mistaken conception of autonomy. Giving children 
an adult-like freedom of choice would downplay the vulnerability of children and endanger a 
variety of valuable functionings and capabilities.
4 For a general discussion of the concept of paternalism see Dworkin (2005); for its relevance for children see Archard (2004: pp. 77–84). 
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The second reason to focus on the functioning of health rather than its capability is that health is 
not only valuable in itself but is also a necessary precondition for other important capabilities and 
functionings. Health is a ‘fertile functioning’ (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). It enables persons to do 
and be many other things that they would otherwise not be able to do and be. Hence illness or the 
absence of health is bad for the child both because it involves the immediate experience of ill-being 
and because it is a corrosive disadvantage: it negatively affects other capabilities and functionings 
and can ultimately destroy them. Important capabilities and functionings, such as being able to move, 
to engage in meaningful activities or to participate in education, are all influenced by the health status 
of a child – not being healthy is a significant obstacle to achieving them. This also makes ill-health a 
major source of unfreedom, especially in social contexts that are not well-suited to support children 
who are in need of more comprehensive conversion factors due to their health condition.
Finally, health is not only a fertile functioning for the child qua child, but also in regard 
to her development and her whole life-course. Health not only describes an actual state but also 
the physically and mentally healthy development of a child. It is therefore itself a developing 
functioning that is best characterised by the continual development of physical and mental qualities 
by virtue of the interaction between biological and social processes (Aldgate et al. 2006). The 
influence of health status and development during childhood on later life has been well documented 
in developed and developing countries. Research shows that poor childhood health is associated 
with poorer subjective conceptions of health and well-being, as well as with increased morbidity and 
a lower socio-economic status in adulthood (Palloni 2006; McEniry 2013). These long-term effects 
of health during childhood seem to point towards it being a functioning rather than a capability, and 
to ground the demand that children actually be healthy. Only during later stages of adolescence does 
it seem plausible to leave more room for choices concerning one’s health and healthy development.
Health, mental health and happiness
Thus far, we have not distinguished further between different dimensions of health but rather 
treated it as a single concept. As our focus in this article is on the value of happiness and the role 
it might and should play in a conceptualisation of justice for children, we now want to distinguish 
between physical and mental health and investigate its relation to happiness. This distinction is often 
neglected when health is considered in the context of social and political philosophy. Furthermore, in 
many empirical studies and policy documents on the well-being of children, health is often first and 
foremost understood as physical health, to the detriment of mental health. For example, in a recent 
major report on child well-being, UNICEF defines the dimension of ‘health and safety’ exclusively 
with reference to health at birth, preventive health services, and child and youth mortality (UNICEF 
IRC 2013). Indicators of mental and emotional health are indeed more difficult to define and 
measure, which is the main reason for not including them in the report. Distinguishing between 
different aspects of health, however, seems to be imperative if we are to acknowledge the complexity 
of persons and do justice to the intuition that physical and mental health are distinct, even if they 
interact in many ways. While not without its problems, physical health – especially the concept 
we have presented so far – is more easily viewed as a necessary part of justice for children that 
society ought to realise. In general, an account of physical health seems to be less controversial than 
one of mental health, as can ber seen from ongoing neglect of mental health issues in comparison 
to physical ones (Sturgeon 2006). As is the case with physical health, there are different ways of 
defining mental health, which bear on the way it is related to subjective well-being and happiness. 
In line with the concept of health we introduced in the first section, we understand mental health as 
having the necessary mental abilities to achieve central capabilities and functionings. Mental health 
is therefore an important dimension of and prerequisite for the well-being and well-becoming of 
children – and rightfully included in any list of central capabilities and functionings. Mental health 
is an essential part of the general concept of health without which the realisation of vital goals is, 
by definition, impossible. Understanding mental health in this way has three consequences that are 
relevant for our purposes. First, mental health is objectively measurable to a sufficient degree, since 
it relates to the ability to achieve certain vital goals, and this ability can be measured by empirical 
means. Needless to say, there are difficult questions concerning the exact relationship between 
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physical and mental capacities or conditions that would allow a person to realise a certain kind of 
life, but, in principle, a person’s health status (encompassing physical and mental health) can be 
assessed in an objective way if one follows our definitions. Second, insofar as it can be influenced 
by societal arrangements, mental health is a matter of social justice and it is the duty of a just society 
to secure adequate levels of mental health for children as much as it is its duty to secure adequate 
levels of physical health. Mental problems caused by limited access to health care or counselling, 
by exposure to a toxic environment, or by hunger, poverty and violence, are justice-salient and there 
is a duty of justice that these ills be prevented. Third, happiness is not necessarily a part of mental 
health, since being mentally healthy implies only a minimum criterion of being able to have certain 
capabilities and functionings, and not that the person in question is in a certain state of feeling good 
or happy. This seems very plausible, since one can clearly be unhappy and dissatisfied with one’s life 
and still be mentally healthy. In fact, people with the same abilities to realise valuable capabilities 
and functionings can enjoy completely different levels of subjective well-being, and the same is 
true for children. A child’s general and multidimensional well-being and well-becoming are at least 
independent from her experiences of happiness and can be evaluated separately.
However, at this point we need to ask whether happiness could be accepted as a goal of justice for 
children. How are we to deal with aspects of the mental dimension that are not controllable and that 
refer solely to individual wishes and preferences? Should these be considered as a matter of social 
justice as well? Or, to put it differently, do children have a right to happiness during their childhood?
There are two main approaches to defining happiness (Bruni et al. 2008). The first definition 
understands happiness as a state of mind (feeling happy) relating it to subjective well-being and 
pleasure (Kahneman et al. 1999). From this point of view, happiness would be a positive emotional 
state that entails feelings – not emotions5 – of satisfaction and well-being. On the other hand, 
happiness is also commonly defined as the result of a balance between negative and positive 
experiences, between goals and achievements, both in one’s personal and professional life (being 
happy). From this perspective, happiness would also be associated with coherence and authenticity – 
that is, to self-realisation – in the sense of achieving goals that are coherent with one’s values 
(Maslow 1968). On the latter view, not every pleasure would increase one’s level of happiness.
In what follows, we will argue that neither of these approaches makes happiness into a goal 
of justice. Although either definition of happiness may be important and positive for children’s 
mental health, neither of these definitions meets the criteria of being objectively measurable and 
being susceptible to the influence of social circumstances.
With respect to the first condition, happiness can hardly meet the condition of being objectively 
measurable, which is an obstacle to establishing concrete policies in order to ensure children’s 
happiness. It seems that the only thing that can be objectively measured is the self-perception 
of happiness, but not happiness itself. Being happy and feeling happy depend on subjective 
preferences, tastes, personality traits and other sociocultural factors. In addition, happiness as 
authenticity – in the sense of coherence between one’s goals and one’s values – depends on personal 
goals and subjective scales of values, which in young children is even harder to establish.
One can measure whether someone feels happy (or thinks she is happy) through self-evaluative 
tests. In fact, the happiness rankings of societies across the world are based on these kinds of 
surveys. Nevertheless, what is important for justice is to measure objectively what makes a person 
(and in this case a child) happy, and not the occurrence of the emotional state or of the thought 
of being happy. Even if one could discover the kinds of things that normally or statistically make 
people happy, public institutions cannot impose these means in the absence of any other criteria, as 
this would entail unjustified discrimination towards those who feel happy by other, less common 
means (e.g. taxidermy) than is the case for the majority (e.g. playing football). Besides, these kinds 
of well-intentioned policies would not be supportive of individual differences; this would result in 
a group of unhappy people due to the very policies intended to increase citizens’ happiness. 
5 As has been widely acknowledged in recent decades (Ekman and Davidson 1994; Frijda 1994), it is relevant to distinguish between an 
emotion and a feeling. While an emotion refers to a concrete stimulus and lasts a few seconds, feelings are the perceptions of emotions and 
imply a more complex cognitive element than emotions. ‘Feelings are the mental representation of the psychological change that occurs 
during an emotion’ (Damasio 2004: p. 52).
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A public institution would probably need a moral criterion to decide what is objectively good 
(O’Neill 2008) for children’s happiness, since happiness is connected to our views about what 
makes a life a good one, which is different from what one deserves in terms of justice. In other 
words, the fact that happiness is related to subjective preferences puts it closer to the private 
moral arena instead of the public sphere, where concerns of justice prevail. In this sense, it seems 
sensible to admit that happiness cannot be part of a theory of justice, both because it would be 
impossible to ensure that the citizens are and feel happy, and because happiness depends on 
our particular life plans and on how we evaluate our present situation in relation to our values, 
preferences and vital goals, all of which are especially intangible in the case of children. Because 
of these interrelated reasons, happiness has also been rejected by Nussbaum and Sen as an 
adequate foundation for a theory of justice (Sen 2008; Nussbaum 2011). 
On the other hand, with respect to the second condition, happiness is not always influenced 
by social factors and, when it is, it is probably due to a mental health problem that can be 
solved through treatment. Although it may be true that a person’s happiness does not depend on 
cultural and educational factors, the fact that a child has a tendency to feel happy or not is not 
completely open to modification, especially if one pays attention to the studies suggesting that 
the predisposition to be happy is highly genetically determined (Lykken and Tellegen 1996). 
This becomes obvious in the case of people who share the same conditions but have completely 
different perceptions of happiness, depending on genetic factors, the mind-sets they have been 
exposed to during childhood, personality traits, etc.
As a result, one could be healthy but unhappy to a certain extent, or one could be suffering 
from a terrible illness and still find reasons to be happy. Insofar as it is both a state of mind and a 
balance of vital goals, happiness is influenced by our thoughts about the reality we are living. The 
same situation can generate a state of happiness, anguish, indifference or sadness depending on the 
person’s expectations, goals and evaluations. 
Of course, being extremely unhappy for a long period of time would probably ruin the possibility 
of having important central capabilities and functionings. But in that case, a theory of justice that 
accepts mental health as a goal could address the problem without having to include an ambiguous 
concept of happiness. The problem here can be approached from within a theory of justice that 
defends mental health as a goal, since justice concerns capabilities and functionings, and not being 
(un)happy per se. Even if some diseases cannot be treated, they would be relevant for justice 
because of the negative consequences for a person’s capabilities and functionings, and not simply 
because someone is or feels unhappy. Otherwise, turning every state/thought of unhappiness into 
a question of justice would imply the pathologisation of sad moods, neglecting the fact that sad 
emotional states are also biologically and psychologically functional (Ekman and Davidson 1994).
Needless to say, this does not mean that happiness is not valuable for children, or that it is not 
a good indicator of possible injustices against children. It only means that happiness by itself 
does not comply with the conditions for a useful and functional theory of justice. Living in a 
just society often increases people’s happiness, but happiness does not increase the occurrence 
of justice in a society, so that the main focus of a theory of justice for children should not be 
happiness, but mental health. One could think of a just world where most children were unhappy 
and compare it to a just world where most children were happy. The latter society would surely 
be morally preferable, but in terms of justice both societies can only be ranked if the children of 
the unhappy society are in fact less mentally healthy. If their unhappiness is related to the values, 
expectations, ambitions and preferences that the children of that just world happen to have, this 
would fall outside the scope of a theory of justice for children.
Conclusion
We have presented a functional account of physical and mental health in relation to childhood 
from the perspective of the capability approach. We have argued that health should be explained 
from this perspective for it to be included in a theory of social justice. We have further addressed 
the question of whether happiness could or should be viewed as a goal of justice. Despite the 
positive impact of happiness in someone’s life, we concluded that happiness falls outside the 
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ambit of a functional theory of justice as it does not fully meet the minimum criteria of objectivity, 
measurability and influenceability. However, we have suggested that the relevant aspects of 
children’s happiness can be found in our concept of mental health without needing to rely on the 
problematic concept of happiness itself. Hence, justice could require that children are provided 
with adequate means for mental health, e.g. through education plans, that would prevent mental 
illnesses and protect children’s well-being and well-becoming. This would surely protect many 
children from suffering and prevent potential mental health problems in adults. However, this 
would differ from making public institutions responsible for securing children’s happiness. 
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